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15	Attorneys for Defendants Eisenhower Medical Center, Eisenhower		
16	Medical Associates, Inc. and Monica Khanna, M.D.		
17		DIGEDICE COURT	
18		DISTRICT COURT CT OF CALIFORNIA	
19			
20	United States of America, and State of	Case No. 5:18-cv-02667-RGK-KKx	
21	California, ex rel. David Hong,	Hon. R. Gary Klausner	
22	Relator,	[PROPOSED] STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER	
23	V.		
24	Eisenhower Medical Center, Eisenhower Medical Associates, Inc.,		
25	and Monica Khanna, M.D.,		
26	Defendants.		
27			
28			



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 5 July 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Impact
of Communist Military Pressure on Saigon

Summary

The most recent Communist offensive against Saigon was part of a general strategy combining military, political, and subversive tactics in an effort to undermine the South Vietnamese Government and to influence the Paris talks. To attain these objectives, the enemy has committed nearly one-fourth of his Main and Local Forces to the III Corps area in support of the Saigon battle. Perhaps 15,000 of these troops are in the immediate Saigon area. Arrayed against the enemy's forces in the III Corps area are some 150,000 Allied infantry and combat support troops. An increasing share of the B-52 effort has been directed to the Saigon area.

The fighting in Saigon has had a significant impact on the city's economic life. The toll in terms of physical destruction, human casualties, and personal upheaval has been as severe as that of the Tet offensive. With some 5,400 civilian casualties through mid-June, nearly 180,000 refugees, and about 19,000 destroyed residences, the city's limited administrative facilities are being heavily taxed. Production and business activity in the city have declined, and shortages of skilled labor -- the result of mobilization -- have become serious. Ample supplies of basic commodities are available, and the price level has remained remarkably stable.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared jointly by the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Current Intelligence and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

Although the enemy's offensive against Saigon has tapered off and still has not yielded any significant dividends, there are indications that these attacks may be resumed. Thus far, most of the city's inhabitants have pursued their normal daily routines and have not displayed any panic. But strains are developing, and a resumption of the seige could lead to a serious deterioration of morale, as well as of the city's economy.

Given the magnitude of its problems, the South Vietnamese Government has made considerable progress in coping with the effects of the attacks. Refugees have been fed and shelter has been provided, but housing reconstruction has been slow. The cumulative effects of the housing and refugee situations could become serious, however, if there is a new round of fighting and construction activity does not pick up.

Despite the heavy personnel losses by the Communists, they can probably continue to get replacements from current levels of infiltration and recruitment for some months to come and maintain the offensive on at least current levels.

Objectives of the Current Attacks

- 1. The objectives of the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam were to bring about a fundamental change in the balance of military/ political forces in the country, to undermine the position of the South Vietnamese Government, to weaken US resolve to continue the fight, and thus to enhance significantly the bargaining position of the North Vietnamese in Paris. The present strategy probably results from a decision in mid-1967 to forgo protracted warfare and to expand the level of combat in 1968 in the hope of bringing the Allies to the conference table under circumstances favorable to the Communists. Such military pressure was to be coordinated with political and subversive activities designed to broaden the base of the National Liberation Front while eroding the position of the government of South Vietnam. launching of the Tet offensive, the recent proliferation of front organizations (highlighted by the creation of the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces), and the agreement to talk without a complete cessation of bombing have all been tactical maneuvers directed toward these objectives.
- The attacks against Saigon, which began on 5 May and continued with decreased intensity through the third week in June, represent a continuation of this grand strategy. While the US military command in Saigon does not consider such attacks to have great military significance, the high casualties suffered by the Communists indicate that they consider the attacks vital to their present fight-talk strategy. Through the employment of a twofold strategy of economy of force and urban guerrilla warfare with concurrent standoff bombardment, they seek to maintain constant military pressure and inflict maximum damage to the city at a minimum cost to themselves. This type of combat generally precipitates an Allied response which causes further considerable damage to residential and commercial property. By demonstrating their capability continually to penetrate the capital in force and indiscriminately to shell its greater metropolitan area almost daily, the Communists seek to undermine the confidence of Saigon's inhabitants in the ability of their government to provide security.

The Communists have not overlooked the psychological impact of these attacks. By discrediting the Saigon regime at the very seat of its power, the Communists hope to legitimatize their demands for a share of power in the South and smooth the way for the establishment of a coalition government. Indeed, the specter of armed entry at will into the capital of the government that claims sovereignty and authority over South Vietnam is a powerful weapon in Communist international maneuvering for the role of chief spokesman for the South Vietnamese people. By imposing heavy strains on the South Vietnamese Government and disrupting the city's life, the Communists appear to be trying to create conditions for a general uprising in the belief that if they can break the will of the people in the city, the government will have no real base of support left. Enemy strategists also apparently believe that by exerting constant military pressure on Saigon and other urban areas, a large share of the Allied forces will continue to be committed to the defense of populated areas, thereby enabling the Communists to assume greater control of the surrounding countryside by default.

The Communist Commitment

Force Structure Deployed Around Saigon

4. The Communists have committed a sizable number of troops to the battle around Saigon. An estimated 37,000 men (nearly one-fourth of the total Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Main and Local Forces in South Vietnam) were in the III Corps area at the start of the Saigon attacks early in May, most of whom have been directly or indirectly involved in the Saigon offensive.* Perhaps 15,000 of these troops were in the Saigon area participating in or providing direct support for the attacks on the city. (For locations of Communist units around Saigon, see Figure 1.) In addition, nearly 6,500 Communist guerrillas are estimated to be operating in the provinces adjacent to Saigon.

^{*} In addition to these troops, it is estimated that about 30,000 to 40,000 Rear Services troops are located in the III Corps area and adjacent areas of Cambodia.



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- 5. Although the enemy launched coordinated attacks against military bases and province and district capitals throughout South Vietnam on 5 May, the principal action has taken place in and around Saigon. The heaviest fighting in Saigon was concentrated in the 5th, 6th, and 8th Precincts in the Cholon sector of the city (see Figure 2). In these precincts, battalion-size Viet Cong units staged raids against police stations and public and service facilities. Particularly heavy fighting in the 8th Precinct occurred south of the Saigon River near the "Y-Bridge" area, involving an enemy force identified as the Phu Loi Battalion. This fighting later spread to Saigon's 4th Precinct. Sizable clashes with the enemy also occurred near the Phu Tho race track in the 5th Precinct, where prisoner interrogations identified the enemy force as elements of the 271st and 272nd Viet Cong Regiments. This fighting represents the strongest and deepest penetration into Saigon by a Viet Cong Main Force unit. Other areas of heavy fighting in the Saigon area occurred at the Saigon Golf Course, the Bien Loi and Gia Dinh Bridges, and the French cemetery adjacent to Tan Son Nhut airbase.
- 6. Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Main Force units appear to be deployed in an outer ring around Saigon that enables them to protect the Communists' major lines of communication and base areas and to provide support to an inner ring of independent Main and Local Force units operating against Saigon proper. The units in the outer ring are primarily concerned with protecting the three major routes used for infiltrating men and supplies to the Saigon area. northern route, extending from the Phuoc Long Province border with Cambodia southward into War Zone D, is used primarily for the movement of troops and is protected by elements of the 7th North Vietnamese Division. Movement along this route has been expedited this year by the construction of a north-south road in Phuoc Long Province. Elements of the 88th North Vietnamese Regiment and the 275th Viet Cong Regiment sit astride the second major route which extends southward from War Zone C in northern Tay Ninh Province toward Saigon. The third route, which runs from the Parrot's Beak point where Cambodian territory projects into the country directly west of Saigon,


splits in two; the upper portion extends through Hau Nghia and is protected by units of the 9th Viet Cong Division and three Viet Cong battalions. The southern route extends into Long An Province and is defended by six Main and Local Force battalions. The 5th Viet Cong Division is deployed along a lesser line of communication which runs across Long Khanh Province east of Saigon.

7. The outer ring, comprised mostly of units of regiment and division size, thus is enabling the food, supplies, and replacements to reach the smaller battalion-sized units in the inner ring that are engaged in the harassment and probing of Saigon. The enemy's ability to rotate units between the outer and inner rings and in and out of Saigon in this manner has proved to be a successful tactic for maintaining military presence despite heavy casualties and Allied interdiction of their lines of communication.

Casualties Incurred

The Communists, however, have been paying a high price in casualties for their attacks on Saigon. During the month of May, the reported number killed in action (KIA) in the Saigon area totaled nearly 11,000 men -- nearly half of the reported killed in action countrywide.* In February, during the Tet offensive, enemy KIA's in all of the III Corps represented less than one-third of total Communist KIA's. During 5-13 May -- the period of the first phase of the May-June Saigon offensive and of the heaviest fighting -enemy KIA's were reported at about 6,200, or nearly 700 per day. During the remainder of the month, some 4,700 enemy KIA's were reported, or about 260 per day. Enemy dead through the third week of June, when the current campaign appeared to phase out, probably were at about the daily rate for the last half of May.

^{*} These are preliminary MACV figures and are subject to change as additional information becomes available. MACV reduced the reported number of enemy troops killed in action in February -- when a similar type of fighting took place -- to compensate for possible inflation and inclusion of civilians and laborers.



Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070014-8

- 1 (d) the author(s), addressee(s), or recipient(s) of the HIGHLY
 2 CONFIDENTIAL-ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY information;
 3 (e) court reporters, stenographers, and videographers retained to record testimony taken in this action;
 - (f) the Court, jury, and court personnel;

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(g) any mediator or settlement officer who is assigned to hear this matter, and his or her staff, subject to their agreement to maintain confidentiality to the same degree as required by this Order;

to deproy such troops to the areas where he has sus-

10. In addition to infiltrating personnel into the III Corps area, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese force structure also is being maintained by upgrading local guerrillas, recruitment, and impressment. The enemy also may be moving Main and Local Force units into the III Corps area from the II and IV Corps areas. There is evidence that at least three battalions have moved from the Delta to the Saigon area and that two regiments are moving down from the II Corps area.

Logistical Requirements

While Communist casualties resulting from the Saigon offensive have been high, logistical costs have been relatively low. Even the highly dramatic shelling of the city has not required a large expenditure of ammunition. During the period 5 May through 15 June, approximately 265 shells -- an average of only about 6 per day -- impacted in Saigon, in adjacent Gia Dinh city, and around the Tan Son Nhut airbase (see Figure 3). Heavy attacks with 122-mm rockets occurred on 5 May with 31 rockets and from 9 to 11 June with 45 rockets. Twelve 107-mm rockets were reported from 6 to 15 June. The balance of the reported impacted shells were 82-mm and 60-mm mortar shells and 75-mm recoilless rifle shells. The maximum effective range of heavy weapons used against Saigon is shown in the following tabulation:

occur until the deadline for the Producing Party to respond to the written notice of the subpoena has passed.

9.2 Lawful Directive by Another Court. If the Designating Party timely seeks a protective order, the Party served with the subpoena or court order shall not produce any information designated in this Action as "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" before a determination by the court from which the subpoena or order issued, unless the Party has obtained the Designating Party's permission. The Designating Party shall bear the burden and expense of seeking protection in that court of its "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" material and nothing in these provisions should be construed as authorizing or encouraging a Receiving Party in this Action to disobey a lawful directive from another court.

X. A NON-PARTY'S PROTECTED MATERIAL SOUGHT TO BE PRODUCED IN THIS LITIGATION

A Non-Party producing information or material voluntarily or pursuant to a subpoena or court order may designate such material or information pursuant to the terms of this Order. A Non-Party's use of this Order to protect its discovery material does not entitle that Non-Party access to the Protected Material produced by any Party in this case.

XI. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED MATERIAL

If a Receiving Party learns that, by inadvertence or otherwise, it has disclosed Protected Material to any person or in any circumstance not authorized under this Stipulated Protective Order, the Receiving Party must immediately: (a) notify in writing the Designating Party of the unauthorized disclosure(s), (b) use its best efforts to retrieve all unauthorized copies of the Protected Material, (c) inform the person or persons to whom unauthorized disclosures were made of all the terms of this Order, and (d) request such person or persons to execute the "Acknowledgment"

and Agreement to Be Bound" that is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

XII. INADVERTENT PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGED OR OTHERWISE PROTECTED MATERIAL

- 12.1 <u>Impact on Privilege</u>. Nothing in the foregoing Order shall require production of information that a Party contends is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege, the work product immunity, or any other privilege, doctrine, right, or immunity.
- 12.2 <u>No Waiver of Privilege</u>. In view of the potential volume of documents to be produced in the Action, documents produced may include documents that could have been withheld in whole or in part upon the basis of an absolute or qualified privilege or some other protection from disclosure. Mere production of all or a part of a document shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege, doctrine, right, immunity, or other protection (in whole or in part) as to any portion of that document, or as to any undisclosed privileged or protected communications or information concerning the same subject matter, in this or in any other federal or state proceeding.

Thus, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502(d), the inadvertent production, or the failure to assert work-product immunity, attorney-client privilege, and/or other legal privilege over a privileged or work-product-protected document, is not a waiver of privilege or protection from discovery in this case or in any other federal or state proceeding, in whole or in part. A Producing Party may assert privilege or protection over produced documents at any time by notifying the Receiving Party in writing of the assertion of privilege or protection in accordance with section 12.3 below.

- 12.3 Notice of Inadvertent Production.
- (a) Should any Disclosure or Discovery Material or copies thereof contain privileged markings by the Receiving Party, such discovery materials shall instead be destroyed, and certified as destroyed, by the Receiving Party to the Producing

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27 28 Party. No use shall be made of the Disclosure or Discovery Material, nor shall they be disclosed to anyone who did not previously have access to them.

- If a Producing Party determines that it has produced a privileged or (b) otherwise protected document, the Producing Party shall provide written notice requesting the Receiving Party promptly destroy or return the document and all copies to the Producing Party, except for any pages containing privileged markings by the Receiving Party, which shall instead be destroyed and certified as such by the Receiving Party to the Producing Party. After receiving a notice from a Producing Party, a Receiving Party must promptly destroy or return the document and all copies to the Producing Party, and may not use or disclose the document or information identified by the Producing Party until the privilege claim is resolved. If a Receiving Party disclosed the document or information specified in the notice before receiving the notice, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it, and so notify the Producing Party of the disclosure and its efforts to retrieve the document or information. The Producing Party may substitute the protected document with a redacted version that obscures the privileged or otherwise protected information. The Producing Party must preserve the specified document or information until the privilege claim is resolved.
- (c) The notices referenced in paragraphs 12.3(a) & (b), above, shall be in writing, shall be served upon Outside Counsel for all parties, and shall contain information sufficient to:
 - 1. identify the document, by Bates number (if applicable) or by identifying information as necessary to locate the document within the materials produced;
 - 2. identify the privilege or protection asserted; and
 - 3. explain the basis for the invocation of the privilege.
- (d) To be effective, the notice shall be provided within a reasonable time, but no later than 30 days after a Party discovers the production of the privileged or

otherwise protected document.

- 12.4 <u>Challenges to Privilege</u>. If the Receiving Party does not agree with the privilege claim, then, after the Receiving Party has returned the documents over which a claim is privilege is asserted, the Parties must attempt to resolve the dispute in strict compliance with Local Rules 37-1 and 37-2 (including the Joint Stipulation requirement). If meeting and conferring regarding the privilege claim pursuant to Local Rule 37-1 does not resolve the privilege claim, the Parties may request in their Joint Stipulation that the Court review the challenged privileged documents in camera under seal for a determination of the privilege claim. Any Party in possession of the information must preserve the information until the privilege claim is resolved. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B). The burden of proving the privilege claim remains with the Producing Party. Any briefing by any Party also shall not publically disclose the information claimed to be privileged.
- 12.5 <u>Reasonableness of Procedure</u>. The Parties agree that such procedures constitute reasonable and prompt steps to prevent disclosure and to address the inadvertent disclosure, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Parties further agree that employing electronic keyword searching to identify and prevent disclosure of privileged material constitutes "reasonable steps to prevent disclosure" under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b)(2).

XIII. MISCELLANEOUS

- 13.1 <u>Right to Further Relief</u>. Nothing in this Order abridges the right of any person to seek its modification by the Court in the future.
- 13.2 <u>Right to Assert Other Objections</u>. By stipulating to the entry of this Protective Order, no Party waives any right it otherwise would have to object to disclosing or producing any information or item on any ground not addressed in this Stipulated Protective Order. Similarly, no Party waives any right to object on any ground to use in evidence of any of the material covered by this Protective Order.

1	13.3 Filing Protected Material. In the event a Party seeks to file any		
2	material that is subject to protection under this Order with the Court, that Party		
3	shall take appropriate action to insure that the documents receive proper protection		
4	from public disclosure including: (1) filing a redacted document with the consent of		
5	the Party or Non-Party who designated the document as "CONFIDENTIAL" or		
6	"HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY"; (2) where		
7	appropriate (e.g., in relation to discovery and evidentiary motions), submitting the		
8	documents solely for in camera review (after receiving authorization from the		
9	Court); or (3) where the preceding measures are not adequate, seeking permission		
10	to file the document under seal pursuant to the procedural steps set forth in Civil		
11	Local Rule 79-5. Protected Material may only be filed under seal pursuant to a		
12	Court order authorizing the sealing of the specific Protected Material at issue.		
13	Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 79-5, a sealing order will issue only upon a request		
14	establishing that the Protected Material at issue is privileged, protectable as a trade		
15	secret, or otherwise entitled to protection under the law. If a Receiving Party's		
16	request to file Protected Material under seal is denied by the Court, then the		
17	Receiving Party may file the Protected Material in the public record unless		
18	otherwise instructed by the Court. Absent extraordinary circumstances making		
19	prior consultation impractical or inappropriate, the Party seeking to submit the		
20	document to the Court shall first consult with counsel for the Designating Party to		
21	determine if some measure less restrictive than filing the document under seal may		
22	serve to provide adequate protection. This duty exists irrespective of the duty to		
23	consult on the underlying motion.		
24	13.4 <u>HIPAA</u> . A Producing Party may designate discovery material as		
25	"CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES		
26	ONLY," if that Party in good faith believes to contain "protected health		
27	information," as defined by 45 CFR § 164.501, and/or "individually identifiable		
28	health information," as defined by 45 CFR § 160.103, or information that is		

otherwise protected from disclosure by the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191 ("HIPAA"). Such documents and information are subject to the Standards of Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164, promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; California Code §§ 56 *et seq.*; or other similar statutory or regulatory privacy protections. The procedures for the protection of such "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" information or items as set forth in this Protective Order provide sufficient protection such that this Order meets the requirements for a "qualified protective order" under 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(v). Parties may not use any produced protected health information to contact, either directly or indirectly, any patients or third parties without first seeking Court approval in strict compliance with Local Rules 37-1 and 37-2, including the Joint Stipulation requirement.

XIV. FINAL DISPOSITION

Within thirty (30) days after the conclusion of the litigation, including conclusion of any appeal, all documents treated as "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" under this Order, including copies as defined above, as well as documents residing on discovery platforms, shall be returned to the Producing Party unless: (1) the document has been entered as evidence or filed (unless introduced or filed under seal); (2) the Parties stipulate to destruction in lieu of return; or (3) as to documents containing the notations, summations, or other mental impressions of the Receiving Party, that Party elects destruction. Notwithstanding the above requirements to return or destroy documents, counsel may retain attorney work product including an index which refers or relates to information designated under this Order so long as that work product does not duplicate verbatim substantial portions of the text of "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEYS' EYES

1	ONLY" documents. This work product continues to be "CONFIDENTIAL" or		
2	"HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" under the terms of		
3			
4	this Order. Notwithstanding this provision, Parties and their Outside Counsel are		
	not required to delete information that may reside on their respective electronic		
5	backup systems that are over-written in the normal course of business.		
6	IT IS SO STIPULATED, THROUGH OUTSIDE COUNSEL.		
7	Dated: July 22, 2020	JONES DAY	
8			
9	Ву	/s/ Jason C. Wright	
10		Jason C. Wright Heather M. O'Shea	
11		Attorneys for Defendants	
12		Eisenhower Medical Center, Eisenhower	
		Medical Associates, and Monica Khanna.	
13			
14	Dated: July 22, 2020	HENNIG, RUIZ & Singh	
15	, , , , , ,	<i>y</i> ,	
16	Dv	/s/ Sam Brown	
17	Ву	ROB HENNIG	
18		SAM BROWN	
		Attorneys for Relator	
19		David Hong	
20	FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOW	N, IT IS SO ORDERED.	
21	D . 1 1 1 22 2020		
22	Dated: July 23, 2020	1.	
23		V an las Alamore	
24	Ву	Contry	
25		Hon. Kenly Kiya I ato United States Mag strate Judge	
26		Cintod States Magestate Judge	
27			
28			
20			

Signature Certification Pursuant to Local Rule 5-4.3.4(a)(2), I hereby certify that all other signatories listed, on whose behalf this filing is submitted, concur with the contents of this filing and have authorized the filing. /s/ Jason C. Wright Jason C. Wright

1	EXHIBIT A		
2	ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND		
3	The undersigned hereby acknowledges that he or she has read the Stipulated		
4	Protective Order dated, in the above captioned action, understands the		
5	terms thereof, and agrees to be bound by such terms. The undersigned submits to		
6	the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Central District of		
7	California in matters relating to the Stipulated Protective Order and understands		
8	that the terms of said Order obligate him/her to use discovery materials designated		
9	CONFIDENTIAL or HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY		
10	solely for the purposes of the above-captioned action, and not to disclose any such		
11	confidential information to any other person, firm or concern.		
12	The undersigned acknowledges that violation of the Stipulated Protective		
13	Order may result in penalties for contempt of court.		
14			
15	Name:		
16	Job Title:		
17	Employer:		
18	Business Address:		
19			
20	Date: Signature:		
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